It's a new year, time to reconsider the old and start afresh. In that vein, today begins a wintertime series of discourses on common baseball misconceptions currently in the possession of most baseball fans and media.
You can probably guess some of the subject matter. RBIs are not king. Speed is not the top quality for a leadoff hitter. Most of what you think is "clutch" is just luck or timing. Analyzing playoff series game-by-game is a fool's errand. Players don't win championships; teams do. Managers hardly matter. Pitching wins are such a weak barometer of pitching quality that we should cease tracking them. Et cetera, et cetera (which is not pronounced eck-setera.)
Today, maybe the single most important concept: the ascendancy of luck.
Luck is ubiquitous, significant and often determinative. This is true not just in sports. Luck is the reason both George W. Bush and Barak Obama attained the presidency. Imagine how their scenarios might have changed had the weather in Florida or the overall economy been different on election day. Luck gave a marginal talent like Tom Brokaw the opportunity to reach the top of TV news while far better journalists and broadcasters toiled elsewhere for far less money. Fitness guru Jim Fixx lost his life to bad luck. Good luck has kept the rest of us alive.
Luck is a factor on every play of every baseball game. A gust of wind, a bad hop, a fortuitous carom, a close call, an aggressive fan, a freak injury, a quarter-of-an-inch when bat meets ball: any one of these can affect the outcome. If you want to find an over-performing team, find one that wins a pile of one-run games. The pundits will say they're "clutch," but they're generally lucky. The proof is, those teams have lesser records the following year. Conversely, teams that lose close contests in bunches over a season tend to improve their performance the next season.
That's not to say that skill, hard work, practice and dedication are irrelevant; they are so important that no matter how many times I bat against Johan Santana, I will never homer off him. (However, I'm quite likely to run home.) In the Major Leagues, where every player and every team is magnificently skilled and focused, the five percent of the game that luck inhabits can make all the difference in the world.
Branch Rickey said luck is the residue of design. This is nonsense perpetrated by lucky people. Rickey himself had the massive good fortune to be born white and rich in America. Certainly people who work hard and smart exploit the good breaks and overcome the bad ones better than those who don't. But no measure of ability or commitment could have catapulted Jackie Robinson's father to Branch Rickey's career.
In the course of a baseball season, serendipity visits every player in one form or another. One hitter's bloops drop in, while another's line drives get caught. These natural vicissitudes add up to what the seamheads call BABIP -- batting average on balls in play. (In other words, not counting strikeouts, walks, HBP and home runs.) Some of BABIP is skill -- how hard you hit the ball and how fast you run can affect it -- but BABIP fluctuates as much as 100 points after accounting for those things.
That 100 points is primarily luck. The same is true for pitchers. In 1999, after his amazing seven-year run, Greg Maddux surrendered 39 more hits than innings and his ERA spiked 50%. Asked what happened, Maddux shrugged that the balls being hit off him were just falling in and that it would even out. Sure enough, in 2000 Maddux threw 30 more innings and relinquished 33 fewer hits as his ERA dropped 57 points. One reason Maddux was so transcendent is that he intuitively understood the hidden skills of pitching.
On average, luck evens out. On average, the wind blows 10 mph. But sometimes it's a hurricane and sometimes the air is still. Most players live in the fat part of the bell curve, but a handful spend a whole season shacking up with Lady Luck while another handful endure her year-long enmity. Total it up and you can see how a player who bats .280 with 20 home runs one year is the same one who bats .250 with 14 or .310 with 26 the next, or a pitcher with a 4.00 ERA one year is the same as one with a 3.40 or 4.60 the next. In fact, these are rather conservative examples.
Now multiply that by team. Whole clubs have enjoyed a heaping teaspoon of nature's smiles that lead to victories in the close games and hot runs through the gauntlet to the World Series. The players, coaches, media and fans can be forgiven for seeking ex post facto reasons for their success -- "chemistry," commitment, team effort -- when a simpler but less morally uplifting explanation is obvious. As King Charlemagne is given to say in Pippin, "It's smarter to be lucky than it's lucky to be smart."
31 December 2008
30 December 2008
The Persistence of Memory
Last week I examined how Tim Raines' generalist abilities and shadow skills have doomed him -- perhaps unfairly -- in our esteem and in Hall of Fame voting.
Today the flip side: Jim Rice.
As with Raines, I make no claim as to whether Rice should be a HOFer. We certainly remember him as a fearsome slugger who dominated baseball offensively for the better part of 12 years. Four times in his career he batted over .300, slugged 39 or more home runs and drove in at least 114. He finished in the top five in MVP voting six times. At the time, we thought that was the definition of a great player.
Today, our lens is more finely focused. We realize the value of walks, of OBP over batting average, of defense, of context and of double plays (in the negative.) And all of those elements line up against Jim Rice.
Let's take them in order. Rice didn't walk. He earned 60 free passes just once in his career, so despite his .298 BA he had a non-HOF .352 OBP. He was never much of a fielder, despite the long-standing New England rationalization that he had a special knack for predicting Green Monster caroms. Myriad retrospective defensive statistics, about which I am admitedly dubious, all agree that Rice was a liability in left field.
Left field, of course, is where many of history's best hitters roamed, and against whom Rice must be measured. It is also the least important defensive position on the field (as opposed to the DH, who is not on the field defensively) because neither range nor an arm are particularly relevant. Rice's competition for the Hall, besides Raines, includes Musial, Bonds, Ted and Billy Williams, Simmons, Henderson, Shoeless Joe, Yaz, Stargell and Kiner.
Jim Rice also played in a hitter's park his whole career. Fenway increases offense by 8% versus today's MLB stadiums, and it was likely higher in Rice's day. Then, when you factor in the 315 twin killings he grounded into, it effectively drops his OBP to .339 and his slugging percentage below .500.
What you have, after all that, is a mighty hitter for sure, but one who doesn't avoid outs, has no speed (58 steals and 34 CS is a net negative) and hurts you defensively. Moreover, his talent ebbed quickly, with his last good year at age 33. Suddenly he's much less Hall-worthy.
For fun, I compared Rice to Raines. Note that Raines played most of his career in Montreal's concrete cavern.
OPS+ is on-base plus slugging relative to the rest of the league. A 100 OPS+ is exactly average. At 128, Rice was 28% better than the average hitter.
You can decide for yourself whether Jim Rice deserves a bust in Cooperstown. It appears, given his near-miss last year, that he's headed in. It also appears that regardless, he is diminished by perspective, in much the way Tim Raines' stature is enhanced.
Today the flip side: Jim Rice.
As with Raines, I make no claim as to whether Rice should be a HOFer. We certainly remember him as a fearsome slugger who dominated baseball offensively for the better part of 12 years. Four times in his career he batted over .300, slugged 39 or more home runs and drove in at least 114. He finished in the top five in MVP voting six times. At the time, we thought that was the definition of a great player.
Today, our lens is more finely focused. We realize the value of walks, of OBP over batting average, of defense, of context and of double plays (in the negative.) And all of those elements line up against Jim Rice.
Let's take them in order. Rice didn't walk. He earned 60 free passes just once in his career, so despite his .298 BA he had a non-HOF .352 OBP. He was never much of a fielder, despite the long-standing New England rationalization that he had a special knack for predicting Green Monster caroms. Myriad retrospective defensive statistics, about which I am admitedly dubious, all agree that Rice was a liability in left field.
Left field, of course, is where many of history's best hitters roamed, and against whom Rice must be measured. It is also the least important defensive position on the field (as opposed to the DH, who is not on the field defensively) because neither range nor an arm are particularly relevant. Rice's competition for the Hall, besides Raines, includes Musial, Bonds, Ted and Billy Williams, Simmons, Henderson, Shoeless Joe, Yaz, Stargell and Kiner.
Jim Rice also played in a hitter's park his whole career. Fenway increases offense by 8% versus today's MLB stadiums, and it was likely higher in Rice's day. Then, when you factor in the 315 twin killings he grounded into, it effectively drops his OBP to .339 and his slugging percentage below .500.
What you have, after all that, is a mighty hitter for sure, but one who doesn't avoid outs, has no speed (58 steals and 34 CS is a net negative) and hurts you defensively. Moreover, his talent ebbed quickly, with his last good year at age 33. Suddenly he's much less Hall-worthy.
For fun, I compared Rice to Raines. Note that Raines played most of his career in Montreal's concrete cavern.
| Player | BA | OBP | SLG | OPS+ | H | HR | RS | RBI | SB |
| Tim Raines | .294 | .385 | .425 | 123 | 2605 | 170 | 1571 | 980 | 808 |
| Jim Rice | .298 | .352 | .502 | 128 | 2452 | 382 | 1249 | 1451 | 58 |
OPS+ is on-base plus slugging relative to the rest of the league. A 100 OPS+ is exactly average. At 128, Rice was 28% better than the average hitter.
You can decide for yourself whether Jim Rice deserves a bust in Cooperstown. It appears, given his near-miss last year, that he's headed in. It also appears that regardless, he is diminished by perspective, in much the way Tim Raines' stature is enhanced.
28 December 2008
A Big Unit in The Emerald City
Randy Johnson signed yesterday with the last-place San Francisco Giants saying he thinks the team can win the NLWest. You think he's crazy? You're only half right.
The team may be munchkins at the plate, but they are Goliaths on the mound. Teaming with Cy Young incumbent Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain and good-looking youngster Jonathan Sanchez, the Big Unit rounds out an impressive starting staff. With the bullpen upgrade Brian Sabean made by acquiring lefty Jeremy Affeldt and venerable righty Bob Howry to team with closer Brian Wilson, this team could have fun, fun, fun.
'Til daddy takes their t-ball away. The Giants' outfield of Randy Winn, Aaron Rowand and Fred Lewis blasted a combined total of 32 home runs, and they are the team's strength. The signing of 33-year-old Edgar Renteria at short to team with 37-year-old Ray Durham at second smacks of a win now strategy without a whole lot of now. This is a team whose HR leader last year was its catcher, Benjie Molina, with 16. There's more pop in a bowl of Rice Krispies.
The window of opportunity has been left open in San Francisco's division, especially without a Manny sighting in LA. If Sabean can ink a bopper or two -- especially to staff an infield corner -- fans could again be dialing up Telephone Company Field in October. Hey, maybe Barry Bonds is available...
The team may be munchkins at the plate, but they are Goliaths on the mound. Teaming with Cy Young incumbent Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain and good-looking youngster Jonathan Sanchez, the Big Unit rounds out an impressive starting staff. With the bullpen upgrade Brian Sabean made by acquiring lefty Jeremy Affeldt and venerable righty Bob Howry to team with closer Brian Wilson, this team could have fun, fun, fun.
'Til daddy takes their t-ball away. The Giants' outfield of Randy Winn, Aaron Rowand and Fred Lewis blasted a combined total of 32 home runs, and they are the team's strength. The signing of 33-year-old Edgar Renteria at short to team with 37-year-old Ray Durham at second smacks of a win now strategy without a whole lot of now. This is a team whose HR leader last year was its catcher, Benjie Molina, with 16. There's more pop in a bowl of Rice Krispies.
The window of opportunity has been left open in San Francisco's division, especially without a Manny sighting in LA. If Sabean can ink a bopper or two -- especially to staff an infield corner -- fans could again be dialing up Telephone Company Field in October. Hey, maybe Barry Bonds is available...
24 December 2008
Stirrings in the Cellar
The Pittsburgh Pirates failed to sign any significant free agents this off-season, nearly guaranteeing themselves yet a record 17th consecutive losing season.
Good for them. They're finally on the right track towards success. If anyone doubts this, may I present the Tampa Bay Rays.
Remember 2000, when the Devil Rays cashed in their draft chips for sluggers Jose Canseco, Fred McGriff and Vinny Castillo three years beyond their expiration dates? Calling that the "Hit Show" was a typo: they left out an "S." Remember 2003, when the same desperate outfit relinquished a useful cog in their youth movement -- Randy Winn -- for a manager? A manager! Billy Beane must have peed his pants over that one.
The erstwhile Devil, now Rays, learned their lessons the hard way and turned a six-pack of first picks into the talented core that skipped to the World Series last season. And that is what you call a blueprint.
It's a blueprint that president Frank Coonelly and GM Neil Huntington have demonstrated they will follow carefully in the Steel City. The trades during the 2008 campaign of Xavier Nady's career year, Damaso Marte and Jason Bay for a boatload of youngsters is the right idea not withstanding questions about the quality of the haul. During the offseason they dangled aging shortstop Jack Wilson to the rest of MLB, recognizing that his halcyon days, such as they were, will not coincide with the franchise's. When no one appeared desperate enough to offer attractive prospects for him, the Pirates put him back in their pocket for in-season discussions with a contender that loses its shortstop and is willing to pony up what Pittsburgh needs.
The team now has an intriguing roster of young (and inexpensive) pitchers -- Snell, Duke, Gorzellany, Maholm -- and players -- Ryan Doumit, the LaRoches, Freddy Sanchez and Jose Tabata that is at least two years and two sluggers away from contention, a country mile closer than they've been all century.
Peter Angelos, of all people, is learning this lesson as well. After dabbling in the decrepit sluggers market (Miguel Tejada, Javy Lopez, Rafael Palmeiro and Sammy Sosa) with disastrous results three years ago, the Orioles reversed field last year and dropped the Human Insurance Premium Inflator, Erik Bedard, on Seattle for mega-prospect Adam (not Pac Man) Jones and a package of minor league hurlers.
The Orioles' pitch for Mark Teixeira last week was based on the presumption that he'll be productive long after Jones, Ryan Freel and some minor league call-ups ripen. Baltimore is at once farther along and farther from contention than Pittsburgh because they play in the AL Beast. They will need to cultivate the farm and enter the Big Boy auction each year, making sure to get the right parts -- as Teixeira would have been -- in tandem with the development of their prospects. More than anything, the O's need pitching, pitching and more pitching.
Why are teams suddenly figuring it out? One part of the answer is obvious: there are no longer any Major League franchises operating on the outmoded principles of the 1970s. Every club has a stable of analysts crunching the numbers like Bill James in Boston, Keith Woolner in Cleveland and Oakland's Billy Beane. While baseball reporters still hang their hats on misleading stats like RBIs and pitching wins, every team in baseball understands the superiority of VORP (value over replacement player) EQA (a hitter's value expressed in a single number that looks like a batting average, but taking into account his on-base ability, base runing and power) and other more subtle and revealing measurements. The inefficiencies in the baseball marketplace that Oakland cherry-picked for a decade are now smaller and more difficult to exploit, because everyone is doing the same thing, at least to some degree.
GMs don't have the luxury that columnists and broadcasters have to be 30 years behind the state of the art, because the results of their stupidity are published in the sports section daily. The columnist versions of Dave Littlefield -- he of no clue -- are voting members of the BBWAA enjoying job security and devoted followings.
Good for them. They're finally on the right track towards success. If anyone doubts this, may I present the Tampa Bay Rays.
Remember 2000, when the Devil Rays cashed in their draft chips for sluggers Jose Canseco, Fred McGriff and Vinny Castillo three years beyond their expiration dates? Calling that the "Hit Show" was a typo: they left out an "S." Remember 2003, when the same desperate outfit relinquished a useful cog in their youth movement -- Randy Winn -- for a manager? A manager! Billy Beane must have peed his pants over that one.
The erstwhile Devil, now Rays, learned their lessons the hard way and turned a six-pack of first picks into the talented core that skipped to the World Series last season. And that is what you call a blueprint.
It's a blueprint that president Frank Coonelly and GM Neil Huntington have demonstrated they will follow carefully in the Steel City. The trades during the 2008 campaign of Xavier Nady's career year, Damaso Marte and Jason Bay for a boatload of youngsters is the right idea not withstanding questions about the quality of the haul. During the offseason they dangled aging shortstop Jack Wilson to the rest of MLB, recognizing that his halcyon days, such as they were, will not coincide with the franchise's. When no one appeared desperate enough to offer attractive prospects for him, the Pirates put him back in their pocket for in-season discussions with a contender that loses its shortstop and is willing to pony up what Pittsburgh needs.
The team now has an intriguing roster of young (and inexpensive) pitchers -- Snell, Duke, Gorzellany, Maholm -- and players -- Ryan Doumit, the LaRoches, Freddy Sanchez and Jose Tabata that is at least two years and two sluggers away from contention, a country mile closer than they've been all century.
Peter Angelos, of all people, is learning this lesson as well. After dabbling in the decrepit sluggers market (Miguel Tejada, Javy Lopez, Rafael Palmeiro and Sammy Sosa) with disastrous results three years ago, the Orioles reversed field last year and dropped the Human Insurance Premium Inflator, Erik Bedard, on Seattle for mega-prospect Adam (not Pac Man) Jones and a package of minor league hurlers.
The Orioles' pitch for Mark Teixeira last week was based on the presumption that he'll be productive long after Jones, Ryan Freel and some minor league call-ups ripen. Baltimore is at once farther along and farther from contention than Pittsburgh because they play in the AL Beast. They will need to cultivate the farm and enter the Big Boy auction each year, making sure to get the right parts -- as Teixeira would have been -- in tandem with the development of their prospects. More than anything, the O's need pitching, pitching and more pitching.
Why are teams suddenly figuring it out? One part of the answer is obvious: there are no longer any Major League franchises operating on the outmoded principles of the 1970s. Every club has a stable of analysts crunching the numbers like Bill James in Boston, Keith Woolner in Cleveland and Oakland's Billy Beane. While baseball reporters still hang their hats on misleading stats like RBIs and pitching wins, every team in baseball understands the superiority of VORP (value over replacement player) EQA (a hitter's value expressed in a single number that looks like a batting average, but taking into account his on-base ability, base runing and power) and other more subtle and revealing measurements. The inefficiencies in the baseball marketplace that Oakland cherry-picked for a decade are now smaller and more difficult to exploit, because everyone is doing the same thing, at least to some degree.
GMs don't have the luxury that columnists and broadcasters have to be 30 years behind the state of the art, because the results of their stupidity are published in the sports section daily. The columnist versions of Dave Littlefield -- he of no clue -- are voting members of the BBWAA enjoying job security and devoted followings.
23 December 2008
Time To Be A Left Inside Grouch
Let's do a little thought experiment, you and I.
Let's suppose we decide to create a sports league, say the N43MSA -- the National 43-Man Squamish Association. We're going to place franchises in all the major US markets plus a few stragglers like Charleston SC, Bridgeport CT and Niskayuna NY. Hey, it's our league.
Now let's suppose that we determine that the franchises will draft high school and college Frullipers, but that all post-graduate players will be free agents, on sale to the highest bidders. Some teams will draft and develop talent well and consequently win more matches than those that don't.
Let's further suppose that the franchise representing the largest city buys up the top player at each position. It can do this because of its market size, media attention, vast financial resources, the glamour of the city, plethora of Fortune 500 companies that will pay the highest amount for the most luxury boxes, and its tradition dating back to the greats like Draja Druvnik and Snookums Schnitzer Johansen.
This team has, in effect, the first pick among left inside grouches, right inside grouches, shallow brooders, wicket men, offensive niblings, quarter-frummerts, full-frummerts, overblats, underblats, back-up finks, and dummies. If the team happens to be a little soft at the deep brooder position, or the All-Star half-frummert is coming off a serious sternocleidamastoid injury, well, the team can always go out and buy another one.
Now, I'd like you to purchase a competing franchise in Baltimore or Toronto or Tampa. Or maybe you'd like one in Minneapolis or Kansas City, whattaya say, huh? Well then, how about just being a fan of one of those sides, attending the Flutney a couple of times a year for seven Ogres of exciting action -- or eight if it rains? If you can't commit to that, wouldn't you like to catch a few snivels on the tube and keep tabs on the N43MSA standings?
Don't tell me you're one of those sore losers, sniveling that the Mudville 43 haven't had to so much as utter a dirty limerick this season. Have you got your lily liver all knotted up because the underblat they wrested away from Charleston with cash broke the single-season Woomik record? Don't cry to me about competitive imbalance; they didn't even make the playoffs last year, or in '93 either.
Would you root for this team or would you wonder what the point is? Would their march into the playoffs and through to the championship strike you as drama or a virtual fait accompli? Wouldn't being a fan of this team be like pulling for North Carolina against Prarie View in the first round of the NCAA basketball tournament?
That's the end of our little thought experiment. Fortunately, this would never happen in the real world of professional sports.
20 December 2008
Didn't You Used To Be Roger Clemens?
If you want to know what scandal has cost Roger Clemens, all you have to do is look at Greg Maddux’s retirement.
Maddux hung it up at exactly the right time last month, before a run of mediocrity started tarnishing his spectacular resume.
It would belabor the point to recap Maddux’s career here beyond marveling at the run of seasons from 1992-98 when he surrendered just slightly more than half as many runs as the average NL hurler. Seventeen straight seasons of 15 or more wins and 18 Gold Gloves may or may not be what they’re cracked up to be, but they’re the most ever.
More to the point, Maddux is being lionized as the greatest and winningest pitcher of his generation. Before we discovered that Roger Clemens was dabbling in Mindy McCready, that was supposed to be his career epitaph. Batters were frustrated by Maddux, but intimidated and awed by Clemens, who retained the heat into his 40s. With more career traction and better stuff, it looked as if Clemens had pulled away from Maddux for good.
What’s the conventional narrative now? It’s the morality play of the tortoise and the hare, with Clemens in the role of rabbit. Suddenly not possessing raw power is a virtue for Maddux. Winning with without high heat makes Maddux more commendable. It’s as if chicks now dig the changeup.
Of course, that narrative was always hooey. Maddux may weigh 175 pounds and wear glasses, but he threw plenty hard and notched nearly 3400 strikeouts. Moreover, he was a great natural athlete who demonstrated his raw ability at the plate and with the glove.
It’s not as if Clemens just rolled God’s gifts out onto the field and chalked up the victories. His heat was the by-product of an intense physical fitness regimen and equally intense mental preparation and focus. He was the greatest pitcher of his generation…until his derriere became back page fodder and the rest of him became MLB’s persona non grata.
I guess that’s comeuppance for the personal and professional skullduggery that Clemens seemed to have engaged in. We’re chalking one up for the good guy. So let that be a lesson to us all. Roger Clemens will still be remembered as a great pitcher, but he gave away a significant mantle to Greg Maddux – best of his era.
Maddux hung it up at exactly the right time last month, before a run of mediocrity started tarnishing his spectacular resume.
It would belabor the point to recap Maddux’s career here beyond marveling at the run of seasons from 1992-98 when he surrendered just slightly more than half as many runs as the average NL hurler. Seventeen straight seasons of 15 or more wins and 18 Gold Gloves may or may not be what they’re cracked up to be, but they’re the most ever.
More to the point, Maddux is being lionized as the greatest and winningest pitcher of his generation. Before we discovered that Roger Clemens was dabbling in Mindy McCready, that was supposed to be his career epitaph. Batters were frustrated by Maddux, but intimidated and awed by Clemens, who retained the heat into his 40s. With more career traction and better stuff, it looked as if Clemens had pulled away from Maddux for good.
What’s the conventional narrative now? It’s the morality play of the tortoise and the hare, with Clemens in the role of rabbit. Suddenly not possessing raw power is a virtue for Maddux. Winning with without high heat makes Maddux more commendable. It’s as if chicks now dig the changeup.
Of course, that narrative was always hooey. Maddux may weigh 175 pounds and wear glasses, but he threw plenty hard and notched nearly 3400 strikeouts. Moreover, he was a great natural athlete who demonstrated his raw ability at the plate and with the glove.
It’s not as if Clemens just rolled God’s gifts out onto the field and chalked up the victories. His heat was the by-product of an intense physical fitness regimen and equally intense mental preparation and focus. He was the greatest pitcher of his generation…until his derriere became back page fodder and the rest of him became MLB’s persona non grata.
I guess that’s comeuppance for the personal and professional skullduggery that Clemens seemed to have engaged in. We’re chalking one up for the good guy. So let that be a lesson to us all. Roger Clemens will still be remembered as a great pitcher, but he gave away a significant mantle to Greg Maddux – best of his era.
17 December 2008
Between "Rock" and a Hard Place
The new Hall of Fame ballot includes the greatest leadoff hitter of all time -- Rickey Henderson -- who is already being fitted for a bust in Cooperstown.
It also includes arguably the second-greatest leadoff hitter of all time -- Tim Raines -- who has a Palin 2012's chance of being elected. (That is, less than none.)
I don't know if Raines is a HOFer, in part because no one knows what the criteria are, and in greater part because back in the days when we were valuing the wrong things, Raines never cracked our fame consciousness. When we look back on his career, we don't remember a guy who was dominant.
The numbers, however, beg to differ. They tell a now-familiar tale of a player whose performance was exactly matched to our blind spots.
Consider: Tim Raines never hit 20 home runs or knocked in even 80. He won one Gold Glove and never finished higher than fifth in the MVP voting. During the period of his career when he played fulltime, 1982-1995, his teams made two playoff appearances and won no pennants. He stole a lot of bases, but rarely as many as Henderson at the same time. Despite leading off for two decades, he's nowhere near 3,000 hits. That's not the stuff of HOFers.
Raines suffers because the HOF wants specialists at the top of their craft, not brilliant generalists. It wants 500-HR sluggers who took smaller leads than Norm Coleman. It wants leather-flashers who charmed the Gold Glove voters. It wants boppers lucky enough to come to the plate regularly with runners on base to drive in. Or at least that's what BBWAA voters want.
Consider the rest of Raines' CV: He hit double-digit homers seven times, mostly before the offensive era began. He posted 12 seasons of on-base prowess over .380. He racked up 400 more walks than strikeouts. The most efficient base stealer of all time, he swiped an amazing 85% of the 954 bags he chased. Despite playing in a lousy hitters' park, he finished in the top 10 in on-base percentage seven times, runs scored nine times and overall offensive performance six times. He was an excellent left fielder and a passable center fielder, right fielder and second baseman. Baseball Prospectus rates him the sixth best right fielder of all time, but even if he's the ninth or 10th or 11th best, that's still a jaunty stroll into the Hall.
My point is not that Tim Raines is a HOFer, but that failing the smell test is a poor barometer because our sense of smell is so much better -- and different -- now. Let's educate ourselves that HRs, RBIs and BA are only part of the equation when OBP, SLG, and advanced stats like EQA and VORP tell us so much more.
It also includes arguably the second-greatest leadoff hitter of all time -- Tim Raines -- who has a Palin 2012's chance of being elected. (That is, less than none.)
I don't know if Raines is a HOFer, in part because no one knows what the criteria are, and in greater part because back in the days when we were valuing the wrong things, Raines never cracked our fame consciousness. When we look back on his career, we don't remember a guy who was dominant.
The numbers, however, beg to differ. They tell a now-familiar tale of a player whose performance was exactly matched to our blind spots.
Consider: Tim Raines never hit 20 home runs or knocked in even 80. He won one Gold Glove and never finished higher than fifth in the MVP voting. During the period of his career when he played fulltime, 1982-1995, his teams made two playoff appearances and won no pennants. He stole a lot of bases, but rarely as many as Henderson at the same time. Despite leading off for two decades, he's nowhere near 3,000 hits. That's not the stuff of HOFers.
Raines suffers because the HOF wants specialists at the top of their craft, not brilliant generalists. It wants 500-HR sluggers who took smaller leads than Norm Coleman. It wants leather-flashers who charmed the Gold Glove voters. It wants boppers lucky enough to come to the plate regularly with runners on base to drive in. Or at least that's what BBWAA voters want.
Consider the rest of Raines' CV: He hit double-digit homers seven times, mostly before the offensive era began. He posted 12 seasons of on-base prowess over .380. He racked up 400 more walks than strikeouts. The most efficient base stealer of all time, he swiped an amazing 85% of the 954 bags he chased. Despite playing in a lousy hitters' park, he finished in the top 10 in on-base percentage seven times, runs scored nine times and overall offensive performance six times. He was an excellent left fielder and a passable center fielder, right fielder and second baseman. Baseball Prospectus rates him the sixth best right fielder of all time, but even if he's the ninth or 10th or 11th best, that's still a jaunty stroll into the Hall.
My point is not that Tim Raines is a HOFer, but that failing the smell test is a poor barometer because our sense of smell is so much better -- and different -- now. Let's educate ourselves that HRs, RBIs and BA are only part of the equation when OBP, SLG, and advanced stats like EQA and VORP tell us so much more.
14 December 2008
The Bad Old Days
I have opined in the past that the so-called Golden Era of baseball, the 1950s, was actually the worst period in baseball history. One city monopolized the AL pennant and dominated the NL pennant and the World Series. If you were a fan of any AL squad other than the Yankees, who appeared in 14 of the 16 World Series in that period, you spent a decade and a half banging your head against the wall. Ditto for the NL, at half that rate.
Some of the advantages the Yankees had then, persist -- money, market size, glamour of NYC, tradition. It's natural that they exploit them in order to collect the best players and win championships. Good for them.
Bad for baseball.
Sports is a zero sum proposition. As long as one franchise uses its edge at every level to win all the time, other franchises must, by definition, stumble. Some of them will act on the premise that they can't compete and wallow in futility. That is bad for them, their fans and the league.
Two quick case studies: After 35 years as a fan of the Kansas City Royals, I switched allegiances a few years ago. It became obvious to me that the Royals' ownership had chosen profit over occasional competitiveness, and that there was no hope of my team succeeding on the field. I'm not a fair weather fan, but neither am I an idiot.
Last year, while the Tampa Bay Rays won 100 games, their attendance lagged. That's standard procedure after years of futility. In 2009, fans will flock to the Trop. That binge and purge mentality, and the attendance fluctuations that accompany it, can be avoided, as long as the team is generally competitive. That's not possible if one franchise, endowed beyond all others, attracts an All-Star squad roster and dashes everyone else's hopes.
All of which brings us to the current state of affairs. Let's face it: the Yankees have not dominated baseball the last four years; they didn't even make the playoffs in '08. The signings of CC Sabathia and AJ Burnett (can't they find anyone with a first name?) are not going to change that without other conditions also changing, like the emergence of Hughes, Kennedy or some other prospect, rebound seasons from Cabrera or Cano, or the signing of even more big impact free agents like Mark Teixeira.
What's troubling is that when other teams are facing recessionary restrictions, layoffs and renewed budget consciousness, the Yankees are accepting public money, raising ticket prices and pursuing almost all of the high-priced free agents simultaneously. If this means a new era of Yankee domination, Kansas City Royals fans are not going to meander to other teams (the Nationals in my case; maybe I am an idiot) but to other activities.
The effect on a team like Toronto is even worse. The Blue Jays could have fancied themselves a player in '09, given their strong performance in '08. But with three powerful in-division competitors, a weak Canadian dollar and the resources of the Yankees, it's understandable why they have become passive. It's now dubious whether a large monetary investment in players could yield much return. How can they compete with a rival that outbid the field by $40 million for Sabathia's services?
So you'll understand why I hope Sabathia's weight and workload start wearing him down and Burnett's inconsistency remains his one constant. You'll understand why I'm rooting for Teixeira to sign with one of his non-contending pursuers and why I want the jettisoned Bobby Abreu to have another season like his 1999-2002 stretch where he hit for power and average, walked like a mall rat, stole bases and excelled in the field, all for someone else.
It's why I hope the Yankees overpaid for so little that they're hamstrung financially in their efforts to offset their mistakes. The problem is, they never are. It's baseball fans who are hamstrung, and that's the shame of it.
Some of the advantages the Yankees had then, persist -- money, market size, glamour of NYC, tradition. It's natural that they exploit them in order to collect the best players and win championships. Good for them.
Bad for baseball.
Sports is a zero sum proposition. As long as one franchise uses its edge at every level to win all the time, other franchises must, by definition, stumble. Some of them will act on the premise that they can't compete and wallow in futility. That is bad for them, their fans and the league.
Two quick case studies: After 35 years as a fan of the Kansas City Royals, I switched allegiances a few years ago. It became obvious to me that the Royals' ownership had chosen profit over occasional competitiveness, and that there was no hope of my team succeeding on the field. I'm not a fair weather fan, but neither am I an idiot.
Last year, while the Tampa Bay Rays won 100 games, their attendance lagged. That's standard procedure after years of futility. In 2009, fans will flock to the Trop. That binge and purge mentality, and the attendance fluctuations that accompany it, can be avoided, as long as the team is generally competitive. That's not possible if one franchise, endowed beyond all others, attracts an All-Star squad roster and dashes everyone else's hopes.
All of which brings us to the current state of affairs. Let's face it: the Yankees have not dominated baseball the last four years; they didn't even make the playoffs in '08. The signings of CC Sabathia and AJ Burnett (can't they find anyone with a first name?) are not going to change that without other conditions also changing, like the emergence of Hughes, Kennedy or some other prospect, rebound seasons from Cabrera or Cano, or the signing of even more big impact free agents like Mark Teixeira.
What's troubling is that when other teams are facing recessionary restrictions, layoffs and renewed budget consciousness, the Yankees are accepting public money, raising ticket prices and pursuing almost all of the high-priced free agents simultaneously. If this means a new era of Yankee domination, Kansas City Royals fans are not going to meander to other teams (the Nationals in my case; maybe I am an idiot) but to other activities.
The effect on a team like Toronto is even worse. The Blue Jays could have fancied themselves a player in '09, given their strong performance in '08. But with three powerful in-division competitors, a weak Canadian dollar and the resources of the Yankees, it's understandable why they have become passive. It's now dubious whether a large monetary investment in players could yield much return. How can they compete with a rival that outbid the field by $40 million for Sabathia's services?
So you'll understand why I hope Sabathia's weight and workload start wearing him down and Burnett's inconsistency remains his one constant. You'll understand why I'm rooting for Teixeira to sign with one of his non-contending pursuers and why I want the jettisoned Bobby Abreu to have another season like his 1999-2002 stretch where he hit for power and average, walked like a mall rat, stole bases and excelled in the field, all for someone else.
It's why I hope the Yankees overpaid for so little that they're hamstrung financially in their efforts to offset their mistakes. The problem is, they never are. It's baseball fans who are hamstrung, and that's the shame of it.
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