30 August 2009

The Myopia of Statheads

Sabermetricians have taught us new and better ways to analyze the game of baseball. Sometimes, however, they fall victim to the allure of their own imperfect theories.

For example, there are various sabermetric player projection systems out there that are marginally better at predicting player performance than the average well-informed baseball fan. These systems know a few things that you might not; e.g., that a player was particularly lucky or unlucky last year (mostly a result of his BABIP -- batting average on balls in play) or how players tend to change as they age, or what happens to hitters following anomalous seasons. But baseball is too unpredictable to...well... predict, even with a computer.

Nonetheless, some sabermetricians make judgements about players as if their systems are infallible and know more than the coaches, managers and GMs who are acquainted with the players personally and watch them play everyday. These stat geeks express shock when something occurs that's outside their projection systems.

Last week Joe Sheehan, a highly respected writer for Sports Illustrated and Baseball Prospectus, asserted that the Braves should flip Jair Jurrjens to another team next year as the Braves deal with an abundance of starting pitching (Jurrjens, promising rookie Tommy Hanson, aces Derek Lowe and Javier Vazquez, Japanese import Kenshin Kawakami and rehabbed star Tim Hudson.) Sheehan observed that Jurrjens has outperformed the pitching indicators and could yield a return beyond his actual value.

Before I disassemble this leap of logic, those indicators merit some discussion. Statheads have noticed that pitcher ERA and won-loss records fluctuate wildly from year to year, but pitchers are much more predictable in their ability to walk and strike out batters, which, after all, are outcomes over which they have total control. Statheads have further noticed that pitchers who aren't fooling hitters, i.e., striking them out, tend not to be very successful. That doesn't mean pitchers have to throw heat, just that whatever they're serving up has hitters confounded sufficiently to keep them in the park and prevent large numbers of screaming liners.

This isn't a foolproof formula: there are pitchers who regularly succeed or fail despite walk/strikeout totals that suggest the opposite, and there are pitchers whose performance fluctuates wildly even though their walk/strikeout rates remain constant. Instead, it gives rise to some guidelines that prevent analysts from jumping to conclusions about pitchers who've been lucky or unlucky.

It's worth noting that for his career, Jurrjens has been the beneficiary of a very low BABIP. Pitchers with low one-year BABIPs often have either great defense behind them or serendipity smiling upon them. Either one suggests the pitcher is less accomplished than he appears.

So back to Sheehan, Jurrjens and the Braves surfeit of arms. First, haven't we learned anything from the '09 Red Sox? There is no such thing as an abundance of pitching. A blow up here, a tired arm there, a couple of Tommy Johns and before you know it, your six starters have melted away. The Braves should try to sign a couple of outfield/first base bats in the offseason, but they should definitely not trade any of the most valuable commodities in baseball.

Moreover, Jair Jurrjens' walk/strikeout and BABIP numbers are irrelevant, at least to the extent that they presage future accomplishments. Sure, Jurrjens has walked 140 batters against 272 strikeouts in his 383 innings of major league work, a sub 2-1 K/BB ratio that is often an indicator of future trouble. And his .310 BABIP is about 20 points lower than normal.

But Jair Jurrjens has been doing this for two-and-a-half years. In 2008 and 2009, he's been one of the 15 best starters in baseball, with a lifetime ERA of 3.43. He's relinquished less than a hit an inning and a brilliant 0.63 home runs per game. Jurrjens hurls in The Ted, not a particularly HR-averse field. He's also kept up this low BABIP, which suggests that he's enticing batters to put balls in play weakly.

The Braves traded for the Curacao native in the '08 off-season because they saw something they liked. Would you agree that that particular franchise might know a little something about good young pitchers? In short, he has proven that he is a superb pitcher despite a tepid walk-strikeout ratio and low BABIP.

The question has never been whether statistics are helpful to analyzing baseball games and players, just whether we understand the stats and use them appropriately. Sometimes even the stat guys forget that.
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27 August 2009

Another One Bites the Dust

Ted Kennedy died? Wasn't he batting third for the Mets?
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22 August 2009

$15 Million Worth of Slavery

The dust has cleared on the Stephen Strasburg signing and thankfully so, because the only thing worse than Scott Boras waxing self-righteous about the injustice of the baseball draft is Scott Boras justifiably waxing self-righteous about the baseball draft.

Baseball's amateur draft (like its football, basketball and hockey counterparts) is collusion among legal monopolists focused on reducing labor costs. I can't blame any agent for trying to bust up a system that deprives his clients of millions of dollars.

When foreign players make their services available, MLB teams bid the ranch for them, so we know what valuable properties like Strasburg are worth to them. The draft is a mechanism for limiting risk and preventing the Strasburgs from commanding those fees.

But you won't find me bemoaning the fate of prospects who can't rake in the millions before they've even made a Double-A lineup. Players who demonstrate that they are worth the money eventually get it. It's hard to cry "indentured servitude" about employees whose apprenticeships only return a half-million dollars per annum.

Principle is not the reason that Strasburg "settled" for $15.1 million. He pushed his negotiations as far as he could and cashed in at the moment his leverage was about to crater. Had he not signed in '09, there's no guarantee that anyone would give him what he wanted in '10...or ever. In that time, his arm could go limp or some Venezuelan in an independent league could clang a fastball back off his cranium and -- poof! -- there goes Mr. Payday, out the door with Ms. Health Insurance.

Principle may be Scott Boras's bag, knowing that a talent like Strasburg could command double in a real free market. Boras has future clients and a long time horizon to consider, but Stephen Strasburg does not. That's why the Nationals brass are correctly considering the fattest contract for a drafted player to have been a victory for them: they got their man and didn't have to break up the cartel.
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21 August 2009

A Wagnerian Opera

By the time you read this, events may have passed it by, but the Mets' Billy Wagner dilemma is worth examining.

It appears that the Mets, by showcasing the fireballing lefty following his long DL stint, and then placing him on the waiver wire, expect to buy out his $1 million option next year rather than pay him $8 million to stay. That in turn indicates that the Mets don't expect to compete seriously in 2010.

There's no reason KRod and Wagner can't co-exist in Queens. They would form a devastating lefty-righty bullpen combo, with one pitching the 8th and the other the 9th depending on the handedness of the batters due up. With the help of a decent "set-up" man, the Mets would truncate each game to six innings, a prospect that could benefit the starting rotation in myriad ways.

Certainly the brains of some managers and GMs (and virtually all baseball reporters) would get snagged on the idea of splitting saves between two star closers. But statistics are servants, not masters. They should illuminate what's important, not distort strategy in order to accumulate them. A bullpen of Wagner, KRod and a few working parts would almost certainly be the best in baseball, regardless who "closes."

No one has done this before, and it bucks conventional wisdom to some degree. That's a big hill for a GM to climb, particularly a GM facing the prospect of unemployment with one more wrong move. Omar Minaya is probably more risk averse than Ben Bernanke at this point, and tampering with baseball tradition is about as risky as it gets, short of violating an "unwritten rule."

Of course, it's not my money, so it's easy for me to endorse the expenditure of $8 million. But I'm guessing that even the seriously-Madofffed Fred Wilpon would gladly spend $8 million for a pennant, particularly given what he's been through the last three MLB campaigns. In addition, the Mets may know something about Wagner that we don't. Perhaps they believe that his two-strikeout audition against the Phillies was his high water mark and that the Red Sox, or whoever takes Wagner off their hands, would be getting damaged goods. In that case, a trade might save them some salary this year, $1 million next year, and return a promising youngster in trade.

Personally, I'd like to see the Mets figure out how to create synergy with their dynamic closer duo. They might actually knock over some false idols in the process. But I'm not counting on it.
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16 August 2009

Blowin' In the Wind

About a year ago I addressed Mark Reynolds' future, pointing out how hard it is for a wind turbine like him to be a productive hitter. In a nutshell, a guy who strikes out 200 times a year has eliminated a third of his opportunities to create a positive result. That means he has to be wildly productive in those remaining plate appearances.

This year, that's exactly what he's doing. So far in 2009, the Diamondbacks third baseman has stepped to the plate 487 times. He's whiffed on 158 occasions, about a third of the time and on pace to break his own K record of 204 set last year.

In the remaining 335 plate appearances, Reynolds has walked 59 times and been hit by four pitches, leaving 268 at bats. For Reynolds to achieve even a mediocre .250 batting average, he has to hit .396 in those non-strikeout situations. (This is a statistic that is regularly kept these days -- BABIP -- batting average on balls in play.)

In 2009 Reynolds has passed that exam with flying colors. He is hitting a whacky .451 on balls in play. Moreover, 37 of those 122 hits have been home runs. When he makes contact, Mark Reynolds has a one in seven chance of banging one out. That's pretty historic, even given the dinger-friendly contours of the BoB.

For the year, Reynolds' line is .285/.376/.603, a level that would put him in the MVP discussion on an alien planet that contained no Albert Pujols. Of course, the big question is whether an otherworldly .451 BABIP is sustainable. The answer is no. And yes.

Ordinarily, when you see that a player is hitting .451 on balls in play, you are staring into a crystal ball flashing "regression alert!" Most hitters live around the .333 mark, and anything far outside that is a reflection of luck more than skill. But Mark Reynolds is not any player. Obviously, he is swinging for the fences every time he bats. The two consequences of this approach are that he fans at a record-breaking rate and he crushes the ball when he does make contact. Hitting the ball hard is the formula for getting hits.

Reynolds' first two seasons presage these results. He hit .430 and .395 on balls in play in '07 and '08, walking and homering at lower rates. His approach has been consistent and he's improved a little. That, his age (26) and his build (athletic, not stocky) are good signs for his future. Mark Reynolds can be a very good hitter for much of the next decade even while stirring up the breeze.
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15 August 2009

Taking Offense in the East

When you add a healthy Jorge Posada, Johnny Damon on a 30-HR pace and Robby Cano's Dr. Jekyll side to a lineup of Texeira, Rodriguez and Jeter, it doesn't matter how many Nick Swishers or Brett Gardners nose their way into the lineup, you're going to be near the lead in the Majors in run scoring. And if you can get plus performances out of Joba Chamberlain and Phil Hughes behind mercenaries Sabathia and Burnett, well, it's no surprise that you've got the best record in the game.

The truth is, the Yankees can ride that rocket ship lineup to the playoffs even without much pitching and defense. They're on pace to score 100 more runs than anyone else in the division, which leaves a lot of leeway in the field.

Look at the Equivalent Averages for the Yankees starters: (EQA condenses offensive production, including baserunning, into one number that looks like a batting average. It is adjusted for home park.)
Texeira .312
Damon .304
Rodriguez .304
Jeter .295
Matsui .295
Swisher .293
Posada .291
Cano .287
Cabrera .266

In other words, the entire lineup is above average, and the second weakest link is one of the top three second basemen in the league.

The Yankees may or may not run away with the division. That's entirely up to the Red Sox. And if you're wondering what's wrong with the Red Sox, here's the answer: nothing.

Oh sure, the Sox have done less hitting since the All-Star break than a Quaker, and several of their pitching hopes have flamed out. All of which is a testament to Theo Epstein's construction of the team. With a working premise that you never really know about your pitching, Boston stockpiled hurlers. They have withstood the Smoltz and Matsuzaka disasters, Wakefield getting hurt, Brad (Hardly Worth A) Penny and other rotation failures to post the best overall pitching in the AL.

The fields have gone fallow lately on the offensive side, which is why mixing Victor Martinez into the Lowell/Youkilis/Kotchman rotation makes so much sense, even if it looks like overkill. What would really improve the Red Sox would be the benching of their two beloved deadweights -- David Ortiz and Jason Varitek.

Ortiz had his last great gasp in June, when he batted over .300 and smacked a string of home runs. Even including those four good weeks, his .221/.310/.411 production is inadequate for a speedy middle-infield gloveman, much less a Brontosaurus DH.

Tek started the season with his hair on fire, but he's cooled and mortified since then to .222/.333/.441. Throw in the black hole at shortstop and the Sox trot out three empty batting spots against the likes of division foes Roy Halladay, CC Sabathia and Matt Garza. That's not getting it done.

Boston still leads the Wild Card race and can be a serious threat in the playoffs. They have to parlay all that depth into a better lineup. And they have to wait for lack of depth to catch up to everyone else.
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11 August 2009

What's He Worth In Loonies?

Would you sign the following guy to a five-year $61 million contract: A good 28-year-old center fielder with a .285/.335/.451 batting line that has declined each of the past two years?

That's essentially what Kenny Williams did when the White Sox took Alex Rios off the Blue Jays' hands through the waiver wire. Rios signed a lucrative deal two years ago on the assumption that he would continue to progress. Instead, he's lost track of the strike zone and misplaced his power stroke, and the Blue Jays find themselves perennially winning Miss Congeniality in the stacked AL East.

At first blush, I thought Canada owed Chicago a bouquet and thank you note for providing them some salary flexibility. But as long as the White Sox believe they're in the playoff mix, sprinkling in Rios has the salutary effect of transforming Scott Podsednik and his whiffle bat into a late-inning defensive stopper. That's got to sound good to the flyball-prone rotation of Buehrle, Danks and Floyd.

At $12 million/year for half-a-decade, Williams may have bought himself an expensive albatross, but he might also have locked in a good power-speed-defense guy who just needs a little instruction. Real center fielders -- not corner outfielders playing up the middle -- who can hit a little are a hard to come by, as the continued employment of Andruw Jones attests. It's a bold and very expensive gamble, but if you're a Southie, it's not your money, so you've got to be encouraged.
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09 August 2009

Inroads

This space has documented a lot of ignorance, particularly in sports media, of the updated methods, improved analysis and new stats that shine brighter illumination on the game, its teams and its players.

But the overall trend is excellent. Sports Illustrated turns over a full page to Baseball Prospectus writer Joe Sheehan for insight otherwise not found in mainstream media. They also reference the latest research in baseball articles, including a nifty piece on base running in the July edition.

ESPN employs Rob Neyer, a direct descendant -- sabermetrically -- of Bill James. Keith Law, another Jamesian scholar, former front office executive and current Scouts Inc. guy, makes regular appearances on ESPN radio. Others, Peter Gammons most notably, regularly mention players' OPS -- on base plus slugging percentage -- a vastly better measure than triple crown stats.

Last week I heard former Cincinnati Post and Sporting News baseball writer Jerry Crasnick mention the Verducci efect -- the negative effect on young pitchers, discovered by writer Tom Verducci, that an increase of 30% in innings pitched from one year to the next produces.

I was watching a game on TV at Citi Field and noticed that they post hitters' OBP. So when Pablo Sandoval and Bengie Molina bat for the Giants, you can see their impressive batting averages but also note their unimpressive on base percentages and realize that they're really not very productive hitters.

Of course, some broadcasters have been on board for years. Jon Sciambi is on the mountain top there and I've gleefully overheard complaints about Gary Cohen for referencing VORP and BABIP, simple concepts that measure (respectively) a player's value compared to replacement player at his position and his batting average on balls in play, which can suggest whether a hitter has been particularly lucky or unlucky over a short period.

It's good. We're moving in the right direction. Now I would like to see the beat writers, broadcasters, MVP voters and Hall of Fame voters understand and use these concepts. Once they do, they will be common currency among fans. Then, we'll all know the game better and I can shut up and close down this blog.

What could be better than that?
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06 August 2009

I'm Just Sayin'

Last year I opined that it would be great for Tom Glavine and John Smoltz to join Greg Maddux in retirement. The three of them ought to make their Cooperstown debuts together. I pointed out that, in their 40s, Glavine had dropped to sixth on the depth chart while Smoltz had earned the loyal customer discount at the rehab store.

Instead, Glavine signed up for one last stint with the Braves and Smoltz inked a deal to spell Dice-K in Boston as soon as his elbow was compliant. And several readers sent their verbal brick-a-bats my way for demeaning the two greats.

Fast forward to August 6, 2009. Having watched Grandpa Tom throw in practice, the Braves cast their lot instead with guys barely clear of their pacifiers, and Smoltz, back from the DL, has contributed exquisitely to the Yankees' pennant run, surrendering a Ponsonian 39 runs in 41 innings. By hanging around one year too many, they'll not only have to retire on someone else's terms (Glavine's services are in demand on par with Mike Vick's), but the magic carpet carrying Maddux into the Hall of Fame in 2013 will have to come back for them the following year.

I also suggested that Plaxico Burris not shoot himself in the thigh. I'm telling ya, ballplayers should listen to me.
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02 August 2009

Mystery Guest, Please Sign In

I'd like to introduce you to a future Hall of Famer. You know his name, and may have even voted for him for the All-Star game. But if I asked you his HoF chances, you would balk. You might not immediately identify him as the best player in his league at his position.

This player, now in his fourth full season, has put up slash stats (BA/OBP/SP) of .298/.360/.504 with 82 home runs. In other words, he hits for average and power. Let's compare him to the greatest ever at his position. (The slash stats are career numbers; the home run total is for the player's first four full seasons)

Our Player .298/.360/.504 82 HR
Player A .285/.348/.482 89 HR
Player B .255/.308/.432 113 HR
Player C .308/.377/.545 127 HR
Player D .261/.357/.366 36 HR
Player E .276/.362/.500 108 HR

Remember, our current player hasn't finished his fourth season, so there are more HRs to come.

It's worth noting that Player C toiled virtually all of his career in two of the three hitting-averse parks in baseball -- Dodger and Shea Stadiums. Mike Piazza wasn't the best backstop, but he could rake like no other.

Which brings us to Brian McCann, who is no Mike Piazza at the plate, but he's at least the equal, of (in order) Yogi Berra, Johnny Bench, Bill Dickey and Roy Campanella. And that's about the best company you can keep if you're a catcher. If he can keep it up, he'll be keeping that company in Cooperstown.
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Don't Believe the Tripe

If you purchased a fixer-upper, would you put new double-paned, super-insulated windows into sagging window frames or would you fix the wall first? Would you consider the resplendent brass faucets a useless luxury for a dented aluminum sink in a rotting counter top? Might you sell the hot tub to pay for a shower insert that would prevent further molding?

This is the situation facing the management, specifically the president and general manager, of the Pittsburgh Pirates. They will never make the playoffs with this team, notwithstanding two or three decent 31-year-old players. The Jack Wilsons and Freddy Sanchezes (Sanchezs? Sanchezs'? Sanchemen?) might help the Pirates win 70 games this year, but they're not going to contribute to the plan for a winning team in 2012.

So when you hear sports talk radio dingoes braying about the Pirates selling off their best parts, remember that Frank Coonelly (president) and Neal Huntington (GM) are trying to develop a franchise, not win 70 games this year. That fans in the Steel City haven't had a rootable ballclub for 17 seasons is immaterial to Coonelly and Huntington, who joined the club after the '07 campaign. Their job is to tear down the dilapidated eyesore and construct something habitable, and that's not going to happen this year or next.

Whether the Pirates have reeled in any usable parts from their offloads of Xavier Nady, Nate McLouth, Ian Snell, Tom Gorzellany, Adam Laroche, Wilson and Sanchez in the last two years is another matter. Huntington has snagged his trading partner's top three prospect in almost none of the deals. But as a scout with the Indians he helped recruit a constellation of stars (that has largely failed to produce) in Cleveland.

Time will tell whether the trades the Pirates have made were the right ones. But we already know that trading guys at the top of their value for young players is a strategy for future success, and that's the only kind of success Pirate fans can hope to have.
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